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a check from an unauthorized person and makes payment to that
person, even in the normal course of business and unwittingly, the
bank is exercising unauthorized control over the payee's property
and withholding it from its rightful owner. A tort arises in favor
of the payee against the converting drawee.
Although Modern Homes Constr. Co. v. Tryon Bank & Trust
Co. was remanded and must be retried, 4 the court's particularly
thorough opinion establishes a firm base upon which business, banks,
attorneys, and lower courts can rely in future transactions.' 5
It is also important to note that the holding is consistent with
the newly adopted Uniform Commercial Code which becomes effective midnight, June 30, 1967.16 Under the Code, payment over a
forged endorsement is specifically covered and is treated as a conversion.' The theoretical change from acceptance to conversion is,
therefore, also a fortunate step that will enable a smoother transition to the Uniform Commercial Code as well as offer sounder law
PHILIP G. CARSON
until it is effective.

Constitutional Law-Due Process-Delay Between Offense and Arrest
The right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the sixth amendment,' but this right becomes operative only upon indictment.2 In
",There are questions of fact and collateral issues which could result in
a verdict for either the plaintiff or defendant in the particular case of
Modern Homes Constr. Co. v. Tryon Bank & Trust Co. I.e., the drawer is
deceased and his estate closed. There was a considerable time lapse between
payment by the drawee bank to the absconded agent and the commencement
of the payee corporation's action.
1 Regardless of the outcome in a particular case, the court is perfectly
clear and definite in its adoption of the conversion theory.
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 25-1-101 to -10-107 (1965). The Uniform Commercial Code is treated in The Uniform Commercial Code in North Carolina-A Symposium, 44 N.C.L. Rnv. 525 (1966). See also 2 N.Y. LAW
REVISION COMM'N, STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1079 (1955);
Scope, Purposes and Functions of the Code, 16 ARK. L. Rnv. 1 (1961-62);
Comment, Allocation of Losses from Check Forgeries Under the Law of
Negotiable Instruments and the Uniform Commercial Code, 62 YALE L.J.
417, 471 (1953).
""N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-3-419 (1965). Faris, Commercial Paper, 44
N.C.L. Rzv. 598, 621 (1966), notes that the Uniform Commercial Code
"will" force a change from North Carolina's acceptance theory to the conversion theory. The article was being printed when the court initiated the
change before the Code forced it.
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy ... trial. . . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
' "[I]f there is unnecessary delay in bringing a defendant to trial, the
1"
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several recent cases the Circuit Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia has wrestled with the problem of prejudice to a defendant caused by delay between the time of the offense and the time of
indictment.' In Ross v. United States,4 where such delay had occurred, the court reversed a conviction for a narcotics violation and
established a rule that is disturbingly vague, yet one that cannot be
ignored by law enforcement officials.
On May 10, 1962, Ross allegedly sold some narcotics to an
undercover police officer who, in order to protect his anonymity,
did not swear out a complaint until his undercover activities had
terminated seven months later.5 At trial this officer was the only
witness against Ross, and his testimony was given with the aid of
notes made at the time of the offense. Ross contended that he did
not remember the events of May 10 and was therefore unable to
refute the officer's testimony.
The court reversed Ross's conviction on appeal, holding that
"there was an undue subordination of appellant's interests which
should not, at least in a record as barren of reassuring corroboration as this one, result in a sustainable conviction."0
In dissent, Circuit Judge Danaher chastized the majority for
finding a "lack of 'reassuring corroboration,' ,,7 asserting that they
had ignored their recent decision in Wilson v. United States' where
uncorroborated testimony was held to be sufficient to support a
conviction. It would appear that the majority, while obviously aware
court may dismiss the indictment....."

FED.

R. CRIm. P. 48b. See Hardy v.

United States, 343 F.2d 233, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Reece v. United States,
337 F.2d 852, 853 (5th Cir. 1964); Mack v. United States, 326 F.2d 481,

486 (8th Cir. 1964); Nickens v. United States, 323 F.2d 808, 809 (D.C.
Cir. 1963).
'Hardy v. United States, supra note 2; Wilson v. United States, 335
F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Redfield v. United States, 328 F.2d 532 (D.C.
Cir. 1963); Nickens v. United States, supra note 2. The court has considered such delay as denial of procedural due process under the fifth
amendment. See Ross v. United States, 349 F.2d 210, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
Hardy v. United States, supra at 234.
'349 F.2d 210 (D.C. Cir. 1965).

GThe statute of limitations for this offense is five years. 75 Stat. 648
(1961), 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1964).

'349 F.2d at 212. Defendant had appealed on the grounds of violations
of fifth and sixth amendment rights. Id. at 211. As incases of delay after

indictment, see note 24 infra, defendant must allege that he was prejudiced.
7349 F.2d at 216.
8335 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
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of Wilson,' found the lack of corroboration prejudicial only when
considered with the delay, rather than prejudicial in itself.
In 1844 an English court indicated that delay between offense
and arrest resulted in prejudice to the defendant, although the
statute of limitations had not run.' No United States court clearly
recognized the problem until 1955," and even now such delay would
probably not be grounds for dismissal in any jurisdiction in the
2
United States except the District of Columbia Circuit.'
In 1963 the District of Columbia Circuit indicated that it might
condemn such delay even though the statute of limitations had not
run.' The court, in a footnote, recognized that "delay between
offense and prosecution could be so oppressive as to constitute a
denial of due process."'"
Balancing the policy objectives of effective law enforcement 5
on the one hand and due process on the other, the Ross court dis'349 F.2d at 211, 212 (citing dissent from denial of rehearing in Wilson).
" The Queen v. Robins, 1 Cox Crim. Cas. 114 (1844). Defendant was
charged with bestiality, an offense forbidden by statute. The charge had
been made within the two-year statute of limitations.
" Petition of Provoo, 17 F.R.D. 183 (D. Md. 1955). Finding it unnecessary "to decide how far rights under the speedy trial provision of the
Sixth Amendment" go, the court considered a seven-month detention before
charges were filed in conjunction with other deprivations of the defendant's
right to a speedy trial. Id. at 202. A student note had recognized the problem three years before this case was decided. Note, 5 STAN. L. REV. 95
(1952).
1 Other circuit courts have held, by circuit, as follows: United States
v. Simmons, 338 F.2d 804, 806 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 983
(1965) (delay in arrest does not violate rights); Reece v. United States,
337 F.2d 852, 853 (5th Cir. 1964) (right to speedy trial arises after prosecution instituted); Hoopengarner v. United States, 270 F.2d 465, 469 (6th
Cir. 1959) (delay between offense and arrest is controlled by statute of
limitations); United States v. Jakalski, 267 F.2d 609, 612 (7th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 936 (1960) (statute of limitations controls institution of prosecution); Mack v. United States, 326 F.2d 481, 486 (8th Cir.
1964) (sixth amendment does not apply until indictment is filed); Venus
v. United States, 287 F.2d 304, 307 (9th Cir. 1960) (statute of limitations
controls time in which indictment must be returned); Wood v. United
States, 317 F.2d 736, 740 (10th Cir. 1963) (delay before arrest not grounds
for dismissal); United States v. Fraidin, 63 F. Supp. 271, 279 (D. Md.
1945) (prosecution limited only by statute of limitations). The First, Third
and Fourth Circuits have not ruled directly on this question. Research reveals no state that has considered the problem.
"Nickens v. United States, 323 F.2d 808 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
1
,Id. at 810 n.2.
"The problems in enforcement of narcotics laws have been commented
upon extensively. E.g., Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the
Criminal Process, 69 YALE L.J. 543, 562-73 (1960); Note, The Law of
Entrapment in Narcotics Arrests, 38 No=R DAME LAw. 741 (1963).
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cussed the specific circumstances"' of the case with regard to the
necessity for and prejudice resulting from the delay. According to
the prosecution, the delay was necessary to protect the anonymity
of the undercover officer." The court found that the delay was
unnecessary, being influenced by testimony showing this particular
officer had made few new contacts in his last months of undercover work."8 Thus the delay could be considered unjustified. Of
course this conclusion was made from hindsight, whereas the decision of the police not to expose the agent was made in anticipation
of further contacts.
Juxtaposed with this policy of allowing some delay for effective
law enforcement was the policy of protecting the rights of the accused. Delay could have been doubly injurious to him; his memory
was dimmed by time' 9 and, perhaps more important, he was charged
en masse with all of the agent's contacts.20 The danger of an
erroneous charge or mistaken identification had been expressed by
Judge Wright, dissenting in Powell v. United States :21
I suggest that it defies human experience for any man, particularly a new policeman, to remember and to identify with absolute
conviction the particular 102 [51 in Ross] faces, as distinguished
from hundreds of others, that passed through his mind, many on
just one occasion, during the kaleidoscope of his months-long
undercover investigation. Indulging the unlikely assumption that
he can remember the 102 particular faces, to suggest that he can
allocate each face to the appropriate
time and place shown in
22
his diary offends credulity
Considering these circumstances, the Ross court found "(1) a
purposeful delay of seven months between offense and arrest, (2) a
" These circumstances are as follows: (a) defendant alleged and showed
prejudice, 349 F.2d at 212; (b) the delay was purposeful, id. at 213
(Quaere: Is the intent to delay determinative in the finding of prejudice?) ;
(c) the time lapse was seven months, ibid. (Quaere: Would a shorter time
lapse rebut an allegation of prejudice?); (d) defendant was charged with
fifty-one other persons, id. at 212; (e) the officer testified from notes and
admitted his dependency upon them, id. at 214; (f) the officer was the only
prosecuting witness, id. at 211; and (g) only one transaction had been made
between officer and defendant, ibid. Observe that the prejudice implicit in
all factors except (b) and (c) would be lessened by more positive identification.
1349 F.2d at 212.
18 Id.at 212 n.1.
'l
Id.at 214.
20Id. at 213 n.2.
21352 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
22

Id.at 710.
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plausible claim of inability to recall or reconstruct the events of the
day of the offense, and (3) a trial in which the case against appellant consists of the recollection of one witness refreshed by a notebook."2 3 The statute of limitations was rejected as the exclusive
criterion for determining when an indictment must be made.2
The court was faced with a problem of abuse of procedural due
process. 5 It justified its decision not to be limited by the statute
of limitations by relying upon a combination of three interrelated
factors: (a) purposeful delay; (b) prejudice caused by this delay,
evidenced by defendant's professed inability to remember ;26 and (c)
lack of corroboration or more positive testimony, evidenced by the
single prosecuting witness' reliance upon his notes."
Although describing the delay as purposeful, it is apparent that
the court meant an unjustified purposeful delay. In Ross, this was
indicated by the failure of the police to prosecute when they had
all the information necessary but delayed prosecution in order to
protect the undercover agent's anonymity. The police were not
using the period within the statute of limitations to solve crimes
or apprehend criminals but to delay prosecutions and provide undercover agents with more freedom of action. This delay is an underlying cause of both the prejudice proved by the defendant and the
unreliable identification made for the prosecution. Yet if the police
justified their delay,2 8 assuming the statute of limitations had not
run, it is doubtful that the court would give much weight to defendant's allegations of prejudice.
The initial factor for the court's consideration was the defen23 349 F.2d at 215. The similarity between these findings and the factors
the Second Circuit considers when faced with delay in prosecuting after
indictment should be noted. Those factors are "the length of delay, the reason for the delay, the prejudice to defendant, and waiver by the defendant."
United States v. Fay, 313 F.2d 620, 623 (2d Cir. 1963).
" 349 F.2d at 215, where the court holds that the length of delay should
not be "controlled exclusively by the applicable statute of limitations."
" "[A] due regard for our supervisory responsibility for criminal proceedings . . . requires . .. reversal." Id. at 216.
20 The prejudice found by the court was the defendant's inability to
remember. The prejudice that results from the officer's failure to recall was
considered a problem of corroboration, or more accurately a lack of more
positive testimony.
2 Corroboration may be used to refer to substantiating testimony as
provided by a corroborating witness. The court used corroboration to refer
to the sufficiency of the identification of the defendant.
" The court did not consider what situations might justify delay. Would
delay caused by an overworked staff be justified? Would delay in the hope
that an addict might lead an investigator to the supplier be justified?
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dant's allegation of prejudice, since if prejudice is not alleged and
shown, there would be no need for further deliberation. The proof
necessary to sustain this allegation will vary with the circumstances
of the defendant and the case. As the delay increases, the court
could more readily find that the defendant has been prejudiced by
a loss of memory. In Ross the defendant was "so circumstanced
that there would appear to be very little to differentiate one day
from another, especially as they begin to recede into the past.""
Prejudice could also result from the death of a defense witness or
the destruction of documents during the unjustified delay. However,
even if prejudice is found, it would seem that the court's ultimate
decision should not be based solely upon that finding but upon the
totality of the evidence, including both the length of delay and the
quality of the prosecution's evidence. Thus a defendant having
proved an absolute inability to remember would not be acquitted in
the face of positive identification.
It appears that the decision in Ross could be justified on the
ground of the prosecution's failure to present convincing evidence
concerning the identity of the defendant rather than the denial of
procedural due process. The court was apparently loath to modify
its holding in Wilson v. United States80 that one officer's testimony
was sufficient for a conviction. Consequently it found a different
reason to reverse the conviction of Ross. In so doing the court
seemed to establish a new multi-factor approach to situations in
which there has been delay in the initiation of prosecution after
the case for the prosecution was complete.
No final conclusions can be drawn from Ross. If the rationale
of the court were applied to offenses upon which no statute of
limitations runs, a court might well find unjustified delay in prosecutions after a period of years to be prejudicial as a matter of law.
In such a situation even positive identification by a witness might
be disregarded by a court.
It seems certain that the court could have reached the same result
in Ross by modifying Wilson and declaring the evidence to be insufficient to support a conviction. Instead, the court, discussing the
:'349 F.2d at 213.
335 F.2d 982 (D.C. Cir. 1964). Such modification would define a
minimum standard for sufficiency of identification and testimony concerning the offense. The testimony of one agent could still be sufficient; however, it would have to meet this standard to result in conviction.
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problem of unjustified delay, began an inquiry that may have further
constitutional implications. Unjustified delay before arrest may
come to be forbidden as a violation of due process under the fifth
or the fourteenth amendment just as such delay between arrest and
trial is now forbidden by the sixth amendment.
Ross v. United States lacks the clarity necessary -to preserve
certainty in the law. Though the objectives of the court could
better be achieved by relying upon a ground other than delay, law
enforcement agencies should heed the warning that the statute of
limitations is not inviolate if it appears that prosecution was unjustifiably delayed.
GEORGE CARSON, II

Constitutional Law-Due Process-Incompetence of Defense Counsel
The petitioner in Schaber v. Maxwell' was convicted of murder
and sentenced to death. At arraignment the presiding judge had
entered an oral plea of not guilty on his behalf. Petitioner waived
trial by jury, electing to be tried by a three-judge state court.2
At the trial, the attorneys appointed to represent petitioner had
virtually conceded that he was guilty of the acts alleged and, through
their opening statement, indicated that they were relying solely upon
the defense of insanity; yet they failed to enter a written plea of
not guilty by reason of insanity required by Ohio law, without
which the accused is conclusively presumed to have been sane at the
time of the commission of the alleged offense.3 After conviction
and sentence, petitioner applied for a writ of habeas corpus in the
federal district court alleging that counsel's failure to comply with
the Ohio statute constituted incompetence and thus deprived him
of effective assistance of counsel guaranteed by due process of law."
'348 F.2d 664 (6th Cir. 1965).
'OHiO REv. CODE ANNO.

2945.05 to -.06 (Page 1954).

' "A defendant who does not plead not guilty by reason of insanity is
conclusively presumed to have been sane at the time of the commission of
the offense charged." OHIo REv. CODE ANNo. § 2943.03 (E) (Page 1954).
Section 2943.04 provides that all pleas other than guilty or not guilty shall
be in writing, subscribed by defendant or his counsel, and shall immediately
be entered upon the court record.
'Petitioner had exhausted his remedies in the state courts of Ohio. The
Supreme Court of Ohio denied a petition for habeas corpus on the grounds
that incompetence of counsel was a matter which must be raised on appeal.
Schaber v. Maxwell, 348 F.2d 664, 667 n.3 (6th Cir. 1965).

